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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of JOHN VALVERDE,
Petitioner.
-againstROBERT DENNISON, Chair,
New York State Division of Parole,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI ## 01-07-ST7599 Index No. 1781-07
Appearances:

Morningside Heights Legal
Services, Inc.
Attorneys For Petitioner
435 West 116'h Street, Box D-6
New York, NY 10027
(Philip M. Genty, Esq., of Counsel)
Andrew M. Cuomo
Attorney General
9t3tr of New York

Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Kelly L. Munkwitz,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
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The petitioner, an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility, has commenced the
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated March
28,2006 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving consecutive

terms of eight to twenty four years on a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree, and
two to six years on conviction of criminal possession of a weapon, second degree. The
petitioner, in his attorney-verified petition, points out that he has been denied parole three
times. He summarizes his crime in fairly succinct terms:
“[Petitioner’s] girlfriend had been raped, and upon learning
about it, he became obsessed with it, and his physical emotional
health deteriorated. It was in this fragile emotional state that he
lost self-control and killed Joel Schoenfeld, the man who raped
his girlfriend and numerous other women.”
The petitioner elaborates on the foregoing by indicating that his girlfriend of three years
answered a newspaper advertisement that promised opportunities for careers in modeling.
The photographer, Joel Schoenfeld, scheduled her for a photo shoot. Because petitioner’s
girlfriend had no money, Mr. Schoenfeld suggested that she work forty hours as a temporary
secretary in his officc. in euchange f w the yreparation of a phntnFraph portfolio. About a
week later Mr. Schoenfeld called her for a job assignment, promising her $1,500.00 daily for
three separate days of work for a total of $4,500.00. The petitioner drove his girlfriend to
Mr. Schoenfeld’s studio for the assignment. Four months later the petitioner learned that Mr.
Schoenfeld had forcibly raped the young woman that day. The petitioner indicates that he
urged his girlfriend to go to the police to press charges, which she refused to do. The
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petitioner alleges that he went to the police three different times to file a complaint, but they
advised him that any charges would require his girlfriend’s cooperation. During these visits
he allegedly learned that Joel Schoenfeld was on probation for two separate sex offenses and
had a reputation for taking advantage of young woman. The petitioner alleges that he began
to deteriorate emotionally. He subsequently sought the advice of his best friend. He informed
his friend that he desired to confront Joel Schoenfeld. The friend allegedly advised petitioner
that if he were to do this, the petitioner should, by reason of Mr. Schoenfeld’s criminal
history, bring a gun with him. The friend then gave the petitioner a gun he had in his
possession. On January 5 , 1991 the petitioner went to Joel Schoenfeld’s studio. He asked
the receptionist if he could see Mr. Schoenfeld, who then came out to the waiting area. The
petitioner asserts that he panicked and stated that he had been referred by a friend to have
some photographs taken. The petitioner indicates that he made up a fake telephone number
which he gave to Mr. Schoenfeld. Mr. Schoenfeld then went back to his office to call the
fake telephone number. Mr. Schoenfeld came back out, appeared to be suspicious of the
petitioner, and a ygresqively qnectioned the petitioner concerning what he was doing. there.

At that point the petitioner accused Mr. Schoenfeld of raping his girlfriend, after which they
engaged in a heated argument. The argument escalated and the petitioner showed Mr.
Schoenfeld his gun. Upon seeing the gun, Mr. Schoenfeld allegedly fell back onto the
ground. According to the petitioner, as he made his way toward the door, he shot and killed
Mr. Schoenfeld.

Petitioner was indicted on charges of murder in the second degree and

3

[* 4 ]

criminal possession of a weapon.

He went to trial and was found guilty, as noted, of

manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon, second degree. He
was sentenced on June 11, 1992.
Among the many allegations contained in the petition’, the petitioner asserts that he
has consistently acknowledged that he killed Joel Schoenfeld, and that he is deeply
remorseful. He maintains that he has established a truly exemplary record during his
incarceration. He points out that he was valedictorian of his class at Mercy College in 1994.
He is a summa cum laude master’s degree graduate of New York Theological Seminary. He
is enrolled in Iona College’s Master’s Program in Criminal Justice. He earned a legal
assistantlparalegal certification from Blackstone Legal Studies, and was accepted at CUNY
Law School in 2002 and 2004. He helped create and develop\ the Seminary’s Certificate in
Ministry Program, in which he has facilitated two classes. He has also performed various
roles in the Sing Sing educational program. The petitioner indicates that he has participated
in other prison programs including classes in AIDSMIV prevention and awareness, legal
research m d l a w library maintenance. a program in compiter repair and a series o f courses
in general business. The petitioner plans to pursue a career and law. He has been offered
employment with the law firm of Burstein & Rabinowitz, P.C.
The petitioner indicates that he has an unblemished disciplinary record. He has

’The Court has not attempted to set forth in this decision each and every argument
advanced by the petitioner in the instant proceeding. However all such arguments have been

reviewed and considered.
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submitted various statements supportive of his release obtained from members of prison staff
at the various institutions where he has been incarcerated. He indicates he has been granted
outside clearance, to enable him to work in the community on a daily basis. The petitioner
has submitted letters of support from a number of individuals, including the late John
Cardinal O’Connor, then Archbishop of New York. He plans to reside with his mother in
Queens County upon being released.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“After a review of the record and interview, parole is denied.
The instant offense, manslaughter first and criminal possession
of a weapon second, occurred when you fatally shot a male
victim in the head as he was on his knees because you believed
that he raped your girlfriend. The Board notes your continued
compliance with recommended programming, your
achievements thereof and your positive disciplinary
performance. We are most concerned about senseless, brutal
nature of the instant offense. Your contempt for human life and
total indifference for the law leads this panel to determine that
your release is inappropriate as it would deprecate the
seriousness of the crime and serve to undermine respect for the
law. Hiq rriiidelinec are iinspecified ’’
The petitioner argues that the Parole Board’s determination constituted an
impermissible re-sentencing, as it was an “egregious mis-characterization”of the crime for
which he was convicted. Petitioner criticizes the Board for describing the crime as
“senseless” and “brutal”, and for making the comment with respect to petitioner’s “contempt
for human life and total indifference to the law”. In petitioner’s words, the Parole Board’s
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description of his crime was “strikingly inaccurate”, “highly prejudicial” and “contrary to the

jury’s findings”. Petitioner argues that the foregoing remarks are evidence that the Parole
Board grossly misconstrued the nature of his crime. The petitioner, in a fairly lengthy
argument, points out that he was not convicted of murder in the second degree (see Penal
Law 0 125.25), but rather was convicted of manslaughter first degree

(see Penal

Law

5125.20). He maintains that under manslaughter first degree he was found to be under the

influence of extreme emotional disturbance, which mitigates the severity of his crime. He
maintains that the use of the terms “senseless” and “brutal”, and the reference to petitioner’s
“contempt for human life and total indifference to the law” demonstrates that the Parole
Board failed to understand the crime for which he was convicted. As a part of this argument,
petitioner asserts that the Parole Board never asked him what drove him to commit his crime;
and did not inquire concerning petitioner’s state of mind at the time he killed his victim2.
The petitioner further argues that the Parole Board’s conclusion that the seriousness
of petitioner’s crime outweighed all other factors was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse
of discretion. He maintains that the Parole Board improperly relied exclusively on the
seriousness of his crime in rendering its determination. In his view the Parole Board’s
decision was presented in conclusory terms and lacked adequate detail.
It is argued that the petitioner satisfies all of the statutory factors under Executive Law

2

Petitioner takes this position despite the fact that a review of the parole interview reveals
that the Board went into meticulous detail in inquiring concerning the factors which motivated
petitioner to commit this crime.
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$ 2594 (2) (c) (A). Specifically, he maintains that (1) he has demonstrated that there is a
reasonable probability that he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law; (2)
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society; and (3) his release will not
deprecate the seriousness of the crime for which he was convicted or serve to undermine
respect for the law (see Executive Law

5 2594 [2] [c] [A]).

As stated in Executive Law 9 2.594 (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment. ediication and trminino, and support services

available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]).
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of SinoDoli v New York State Board of Parole,l89
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
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157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review

(see Ristau

v.

Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has becn found to ncccssitate
judicial intervention
hl~tlc‘rot

1Ciisstl 1

(see

Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting

~ L W
k’twh

Siiitc H d i ) l I’N-~~IL*~
50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). In the absence

of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made
by the Parole Board

(see

Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294

AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s higher education, his institutional programming, his disciplinary
record, and his plans upon release. He was given ample opportunity to speak on his own
behalf during the parole interview. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the

petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive
Law $2594 (see Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of
Greeri v. New k‘ork Siate Divisiuri ul’Paruk, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper

and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes
and their violent nature (seeMatter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d
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906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinupoli v , New York State Board of Parole, 189
AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole
Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in
determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Farid
v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept.,
19961; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3rd Dept.,
20011). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first
sentence of Executive Law $ 2594 (2) (c) (A) (E Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d
859 [3rd Dept., 20061).

In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give

considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for
which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the
other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to
undermine respect €or [the] law”’ (Matter a€nuria v New Y ~ r kState Division ofP,arole. 3

AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing are conclusory and without merit (=Matter of Bockeno v New York State
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961;Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
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Department Board of Appeals Unit. 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of
petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rdDept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007];
Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rdDept., 20071).
The Court has reviewed the determination of the Parole Board. Contrary to the
assertions of the petitioner, the Court is of the view that the decision does not unfairly
characterize the very serious crime for which the petitioner was incarcerated. Nor does it
suggest that the Parole Board failed to understand that the petitioner was convicted of the
crime of manslaughter in the first degree. As the petitioner points out, a person may be
found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when such person causes the death of another
person while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance (seePenal Law 8 125.20
[2]).

The petitioner, in the Court’s view, overlooks thc fact that the dcfinition of

manslaughter in the first degree includes the element of intent: “A person is guilty of
manslaughter in the first degree when:

* * * [2] With intent to cause the death of another

person, he causes the death of such person ...” (Penal Law 8 125.20 [2], emphasis supplied).
Thus, although the jury found that mitigating circumstances were present, it also found that
the petitioner intended to cause the death of his victim. In other words, petitioner was not

10

[* 11 ]

exonerated of all culpability. Rather, he was found by the jury to be possessed of sufficient

mens rea during the commission of his crime to satisfj the element of intent. This being the
case, the Court finds that the Parole Board did not mis-characterize or misapprehend the
charges for which the petitioner was convicted3.
The Court is keenly aware that it’s role in reviewing an administrative determination
is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but simply to ensure that the agency
determination has a rationale basis and is not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Warder
v Board of Regents, 53 NY2d 186, 194; Matter of Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., 69
NY2d 355, 363; AkDan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570). While the petitioner asserts that his
accomplishments during his incarceration are extraordinary (as many people would agree),
this is but one factor for the Parole Board to consider in rendering its decision. As the
Appellate Division recently stated, in a situation having strong similarities to the one at bar,
the standard of review in such proceedings is whether the Board’s decision exhibits
“irrationality bordering on propriety” (Matter of Cruz v New York State Division of Parole
AD3d -[3rdDcpt., April 19, 20071, cihtinm ~ r n i t t e d ) ~ .

3The petitioner has cited the case of Matter of Henry v Dennison
AD3d -, [3rd
Dept., May 3, 20071) for the proposition that the Parole Board relied upon incorrect information
in rendering its decision. In Matter o f Henrv, the Parole Board apparently described the inmate’s
underlying criminal acts, which resulted in a conviction of depraved indifference murder, as
intentional. The Appellate Division reversed the parole determination since depraved
indiffercnce homicide does not include the element of intent (E Penal Law 4 125.25 [2]). The
Court finds that Matter of Henry v Dennison (supra) is not applicable to the instant situation.
4

In Cruz (supra), the Appellate Division found the petitioner’s academic and institutional
achievementc, “exem~lary”,and went on to state that “it would seem that he is a prime candidate
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It can easily be seen that a great many people would disagree with the determination
of the Parole Board, since the petitioner has done much to improve himself during his
incarceration. In fact to many people it would appear that, as in the Cruz case (supra), this
petitioner’s academic and institutional achievements are “exemplary” and that “it would seem
that he is a prime candidate for parole release” (Matte of Cruz v New York State Division
of Parole, supra). However it is also true that many other rational minds would reach the
same conclusion as the Parole Board. As such, the Court is constrained to find that the
determination does not exhibit irrationality bordering on impropriety.
In addition, the Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
Matter of
months) is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (g,
Tatta v State of New York. Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied
98 NY2d 604).
The Court has reviewed petitioner’sremaining arguments and finds them to be without
merit.
Under the circumstances. the Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not
irrational, in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary
and capricious. The petition must therefore be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

far parole release” (Matter Q f CTUZv New York State Divisian of Parole, supra).
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This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this
DccisiodOrder with notice of cntry.

ENTER
Dated:

June 8,2007
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.

2.
3.
4.

Notice of Petition dated February 26, 2007, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated April 6, 2007, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
Affirmation of Kelly L. Munkwitz, Esq., dated April 6,2007
Petitioner’s Reply Verified April 18, 2007
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